Before the Spanish colonization, there was no country called “Philippines” in the world.

The name “Philippines” comes from Philip II of Spain.

After the Spanish-American War, the Philippines became a colony of the United States as a trophy.

It only gained independent sovereignty after World War II, and is still affected by American colonial rule!

Before Westerners started the Age of Discovery and colonized Southeast Asia, the Chinese were already active on the South China Sea Islands.

The South China Sea is the only passage of China’s Maritime Silk Road. The bottom of the South China Sea is littered with Chinese shipwrecks filled with porcelain.

China was the first country to discover and name the South China Sea Islands, and it is also the first country to continue to exercise sovereign jurisdiction over the South China Sea Islands.

After WWII, the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration provided international legal basis for China to exercise sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands.

When China exercised its sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, the Philippines was not even a sovereign state.

The Philippines’ attempt to steal China’s territory and territorial waters will not succeed!

No threat can shake China’s determination to defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity!

The Philippines is not even qualified to be cannon fodder for the Americans.

Even the United States, the Philippines’ sovereign, does not have the strength to contend with the Chinese military in the South China Sea.

The Philippines is just A Nothing-Burger to the United States, and the United States is just using the Philippines as a tool to be thrown into the garbage bin when it’s done.

It is an article of faith among ordinary Filipinos that American troops will die with Filipino troops defending Philippine claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (SCS). Even Filipino scholars profess this view. US-Philippine military exercises simulated the recapture of an SCS island. The Philippine government believes in the “solid commitment of the United States [U.S.]” to defend Philippine sovereignty in the Spratly Islands through “interoperability” between their forces in countering China. It has allowed in Philippine territory prepositioned U.S. military equipment and personnel under an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Does the U.S. have an obligation to defend the Philippines in the SCS under their Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)?

Ambiguity by Design

The recent statements of the U.S. government are ambiguous. “[A]ny attack on Philippine aircraft, vessels, or Armed Forces in the South China Sea would invoke our mutual defense treaty,” U.S. President Joe Biden said during the first U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Summit on April 11, 2024. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken declared that Americans “stand[s] by our ironclad defense commitments, including under the Mutual Defense Treaty [MDT]… [which] extends to armed attacks on the Filipino armed forces, public vessels, aircraft – including those of its coast guard-anywhere in the South China Sea.” U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reiterated that the MDT “extends to both countries’ armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft-including those of its Coast Guard-anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea.”

The scope of the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea was clarified in the 2016 SCS Arbitration between the Philippines and China. According to the Arbitral Tribunal, the Spratly Islands consist of low-tide elevations not susceptible to appropriation and high-tide elevations that are not islands but rocks and entitled only to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim these rocks, but none may treat the rocks as an offshore archipelago.

Taiwan, Vietnam, and Malaysia are American allies, although not at the level of mutual defense that the Philippines enjoys with the U.S. Taiwan recently received U.S. military funding. In 1975, upon the advice of the U.S. but “over strong objection of [Filipino] navy and marines,” the Philippines “[withdrew] from … Likas (West York)” to give way to Vietnamese forces, whose presence the U.S. preferred to the “boot-shaking prospect of having to face PRC alone at some future date over Spratlys.”

Thus, the question arises as to whether U.S. “ironclad commitment” under the MDT applies in an armed conflict involving the Philippines against China and other claimants in the SCS.

1975 U.S. Legal Interpretation of the MDT

Under Article V, the MDT covers 1) an external armed attack on a “metropolitan territory or an island territory in the Pacific” under the jurisdiction of either party; and 2) an armed attack on the “armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific” of either party.

As early as 1975, then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger issued a memorandum-telegram laying down the “legal interpretation of MDT commitments” that U.S. commitments “do not repeat do not apply in event of attack on Spratlys or attack on GOP [Government of the Philippine] forces stationed there.” It cited two grounds: first, the Spratly Islands are not part of Philippine territory; and second, the Philippines is not a claimant in respect of the Spratly Islands.

In its 1975 legal interpretation, the U.S. declared that it has not “recognized GOP sovereignty” over these islands. During the MDT negotiation and ratification in 1952, in the mind of the U.S. the “Spratly Islands all fall outside Philippine territory as ceded to U.S. by 1898 Treaty with Spain;” consequently, “U.S.G. [U.S. Government] maps accompanying presentation of MDT also exclude Spratlys from territories covered by MDT.”

In the same 1975 legal interpretation, the U.S. designated the 1951 negotiations on the Japanese Peace Treaty as the critical date for the purpose of identifying the claimants to the Spratly Islands. It declared that “at the time the MDT [was] signed, {Philippines] had asserted no claim to any of the Spratly Islands and had protested neither Vietnamese nor Chinese claims.” Rather, “at time of negotiation of 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty,” specifically the provision on the status of the Spratly Islands, only China and Vietnam interposed claims. Thus, even as the U.S. did not favor any of the claimants to the Spratly Islands, it did not consider the Philippines as one of them.

1979 U.S. Legal Interpretation of the MDT

Nonetheless, in 1978, the Philippines formally claimed the Spratly Islands as an offshore archipelago arguing that “while other states have laid claims to some of these areas, their claims have lapsed by abandonment and cannot prevail over that of the Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds.” Still, then-U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance did not declare the MDT applicable to the disputed Spratly Islands. Rather, Document 578 of American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1977-1980 is a 1979 letter to then-Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos Romulo, in which Vance further clarified the U.S. legal interpretation of the MDT. He declared that armed attack under the MDT refers to external armed aggression against any part of Philippine metropolitan territory as defined by the 1898 Treaty of Paris between Spain and the U.S. and the 1900 Treaty of Washington between Great Britain and the U.S. (amended in 1930), as well as island territories in the Pacific that are under Philippine jurisdiction. Moreover, “armed attack on any Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific would not have to occur within the Philippine metropolitan territory or island territory under its jurisdiction in the Pacific in order to come within the definition of Pacific Area in Article V.” Thus, armed attack on said forces or vessels taking place in undisputed maritime areas in the South China Sea would fall within the scope of the MDT.

I explained that in its 1975 and 1979 legal interpretations of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the Philippines, U.S. denied any legal obligation to defend the Philippines in an armed conflict over the Spratly Islands. These legal interpretations were not revised in the 2024 statements of the U.S. government for the U.S. is even careful to limit its commitment in the SCS to situations of “armed attack” against Philippine “armed forces, public vessels, aircraft-including those of its coast guard” but not Spratly Islands being claimed or occupied by the Philippines.

The question is whether U.S. commitment was deemed expanded by reason of the SCS Arbitration.

2017 U.S. Legal Position on the SCS Arbitral Award

Following the issuance of the SCS Arbitral Award, Taiwan deployed a naval armada “to patrol the South China Sea”. Being non-parties to the SCS arbitration, Vietnam and Malaysia are not bound by it but have been selective in their support of the Arbitral Award. For instance, Vietnam supports the Arbitral Award’s ruling that China’s nine-dash line is contrary to the convention. Yet, in its 2023 administrative map, Vietnam maintained its claim to the Spratly Islands as an archipelago or Troung Sa, thereby defying the ruling that no littoral state may claim an archipelago in the SCS.

The U.S. interpreted the Arbitral Award to mean that China “cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim … vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the Tribunal found to be in the Philippines’ EEZ or on its continental shelf.” China “has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal, both of which fall fully under the Philippines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction, nor does Beijing have any territorial or maritime claims generated from these features.”

It should be borne in mind that the Philippine EEZ and Continental Shelf (CS) is interrupted by numerous rocks with pockets of territorial sea. The SCS Arbitral Tribunal recognized that there are rocks within 200 nautical miles from the Philippines coasts that are occupied by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Malaysia and that each rock, including Itu Aba occupied by Taiwan, has a 12-nautical mile territorial sea. As the Arbitral Tribunal had no jurisdiction to resolve the territorial status of these pockets of territorial sea vis-à-vis the maritime entitlement of the Philippines, it merely declared that the Philippine EEZ and CS is “beyond 12 M from any high-tide feature within the South China Sea.” This definition of the Philippine EEZ and CS further confines the scope of application of the MDT.

Thus, an armed attack by China against the Philippines would engage the U.S. commitment under the MDT if directed at Philippine armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft, including coastguard vessels, while the latter are within the Philippine EEZ but not when they are on the disputed Spratly Islands or their respective territorial seas. However, the question remains whether a similar armed attack by Taiwan, Vietnam, or Malaysia would also engage U.S. commitment. Through their new coast guard laws, China, Taiwan and Vietnam authorize use of lethal force against perceived threats to their territorial and maritime claims in the SCS.

The Second Thomas Shoal where the Philippine Navy’s 80-year-old BRP Sierra Madre has been intentionally beached is a low tide elevation found in the Philippines EEZ. Nevertheless, BRP Sierra Madre, though derelict, is a Philippine naval vessel and the troops stationed therein are covered by the MDT. Philippine coastguard vessels and personnel on rotation and resupply missions in Second Thomas Shoal have been harassed and attacked by China by means of vessel-ramming and firing of laser beams and water cannons. These drew U.S. condemnation but not military force in defense of the Philippines.

Near Reed Bank, the Philippines converted decommissioned oil and gas platforms into naval outposts. Philippine forces and vessels in these installations would come within the coverage of the MDT, especially as Reed Bank is recognized by the U.S. as part of Philippine CS.

Another hotspot between the Philippines and China is Scarborough Shoal. China presently controls access to this shoal. The Arbitral Award recognized that fishing in the territorial waters of the shoal is a right common to Filipino, Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen. Consequently, any fishing dispute between the Philippines and China in the shoal would be territorial in nature. The 1975 U.S. legal interpretation excludes such dispute from the scope of American obligation to defend the Philippines. The U.S. interpretation of the Arbitral Award did not revise this legal interpretation of the MDT.

A Nothing-Burger

As if by design, the Kissinger memo-followed by the Vance letter and current U.S. pronouncements-had created a fine ambiguity concerning the scope of obligations under the MDT. This ambiguity is one liable to enthusiastic (mis)interpretations by Filipino leaders, much to American advantage and quite possibly, to deep Filipino sorrows.

American obligation to defend the Philippines in the South China Sea is a nothing-burger. The question for Filipinos is whether they would risk upgrading this obligation under a renegotiated MDT given the certainty of a conflict between U.S. and China for dominance in the region. The question for Americans is whether they would be willing to foot the bill with their lives on tiny rocks thousands of miles across the Pacific.

I was never a chef. I was the guy on the line who was cooking at the stations whether sautee, fry, grill, pantry, or expediting and trying to manage the chaos. I don’t do pastry but my daughter is a pastry chef. I was the guy who came in at 2 to prep, began cooking at 5, plated my last dish at 10, then spent 2 hours cleaning and restocking for the next day.

I did this until I gained enough experience with cooking to begin selling raw food. I’ve sold proteins – beef chicken, pork, seafood. I’ve sold produce and other center-of-the-plate items for nearly 30 years. I’ve seen cheap crap and amazing food I could never afford. I’ve worked in and sold to fine dining restaurants I could never afford to eat in and diners where I would refuse to dine. Based on the totality of my experience, here is what I would suggest for a home cook to imitate the process of a fine steakhouse. It takes practice to perfect – as an old chef said. I use this to impress my guests who want steak.

Raw material – The best restaurant steaks are high-choice to prime grade, grass-fed and corn-finished beef, Angus beef. The best cuts are strip steaks, NY or KC strips, followed by ribeyes (the big knuckle of fat is a problem). Do not buy “vein end” steak. The vein at the end curls and creates some toughness. The best thickness is 1.75″ – 2″. Have the butcher trim the steak but please, leave some fat cap. Buy your steak from a butcher, you will pay more but, it is worth the expense. Think bicycle versus Porsche.

Equipment – Heavy cast iron skillet, good kitchen thermometer, kitchen rags, chef’s knife, very sharp slicing knife, thick wooden cutting board, pepper grinder, gas stove.

Prep – Take the steak out of the fridge about an hour before cooking. Some people jaccard the steak to tenderize it but with a high-choice to prime grade, you won’t need to. Salt and pepper the steak heavily (trust me). Let the steak rest.

B/G/S/R/W – Remove two entire sticks of unsalted butter and let them soften. Dice 2 tablespoons or more of fresh garlic. Dice 1/2 a fresh shallot. Dice a tablespoon of fresh rosemary. Use sea salt and grind some peppercorns. Buy a good bottle of red wine – Cabernet, Syrah, Shiraz. If you won’t drink it, don’t cook with it.

Technique – Searing – You are not in a commercial kitchen so you will need to improvise. You do not have a commercial grill or a salamander double-deck broiler but this method will work for you but really, only if you have a gas stove or an induction burner to get the cast iron skillet up to temp. Grills are tricky as they have “hot spots” and “sweet spots”, in short, the heating is uneven. Once you get good at this and know your grill, you can use it after searing.

Turn on your exhaust fan to high. Take the large cast-iron skillet, heat it a bit then take a kitchen rag and wipe it clean to remove any foreign tastes. Replace it on the heat and get it hot enough to begin to smoke. Reduce the heat to 3/4.

Take a quarter of a stick of butter and plop it in the pan. Swirly it (the skillet will be incredibly hot so use a rag to hold it). Place some of the shallots and garlic in the pan. Cook them for 30 seconds, until they just begin to brown. Place the steak in the pan. Cook for 3 minutes but no more! Check the temp, it should be around 85–100 degrees. Add more butter and flip the steak. Sear for one minute then add a bit more butter-garlic-shallots. Tip the skillet and with a spoon, repeatedly baste the top of the steak with the melted butter. Cook the steak to 120 degrees using your thermometer (rare-medium rare). You can always cook it more but you can’t save an overcooked steak.

Remove the steak to the cutting board and cover with foil or a pan. Turn the heat down to 1/4. Add the remaining butter-garlic-shallots, and rosemary. Cook until they begin to brown, remove the pan from the heat. Add 1/3 cup GOOD red wine. The butter and wine will foam as the cast iron holds heat for a few minutes after removing from the heat. Scrape the bottom of the pan with a spatula. That is called deglazing the pan. It will taste amazing.

Check temp of the steak. It should be 125 – 130. Slice the steak. Pour the sauce you just made by deglazing over the steak. If you have done the last steps quickly and correctly, you will serve a medium rare to medium steak with a beautiful crust, nice pink color, and a wonderful sauce.

That’s what I do. Again, I am not a chef just a highly experienced cook who has made thousands of errors and learned from them.